In this paper stochastic dynamic programming is used to investigate habitat conservation by a multitude of landholders under uncertainty about the value of environmental services and irreversible development. We study land conversion under competition on the market for agricultural products when voluntary and mandatory measures are combined by the Government to induce adequate participation in a conservation plan. We analytically determine the impact of uncertainty and optimal policy conversion dynamics and discuss di¤erent policy scenarios on the basis of the relative long-run expected rate of deforestation. Finally, some numerical simulations are provided to illustrate our …ndings.
Introduction
As human population grows, the human-Nature con ‡ict has become more severe and natural habitats are more exposed to conversion. On the one hand, clearing land to develop it may lead to the irreversible reduction or loss of valuable environmental services (hereafter, ES) such as biodiversity conservation, carbon sequestration, watershed control and provision of scenic beauty for recreational activities and ecotourism. On the other hand, conserving land in its pristine state has a cost opportunity in terms of foregone pro…ts from economic activities (e.g. agriculture, commercial forestry) which can be undertaken once land has been cleared.
By balancing marginal social bene…t and cost of conservation, the social planner is required to destine the available land to conservation or development which are usually two competing and mutually exclusive uses. Despite its theoretical appeal, the idea of a social planner who, having de…ned a socially optimal habitat conversion rule, can implement it by simply commanding the constitution of protected areas, is far from reality. In fact, since the majority of remaining ecosystems are on land privately owned, the economic and political cost of such intervention would make the adoption of command mechanisms by Governments unlikely (Langpap and Wu, 2004; Sierra and Russman, 2006 ). In addition, as pointed out by Folke et al.(1996 Folke et al.( , p. 1019 , "keeping humans out of nature through a protected-area strategy may buy time, but it does not address the factors in society driving the loss of biodiversity". In other words, protecting natural ecosystems through natural reserves and other protected areas may be a signi…cant step in the short-run to deal with severe and immediate threats but it still does not create the structure of incentives able to mitigate the con ‡ict human-Nature in the long-run.
At least initially, Governments favoured an indirect approach in conservation policies. The main idea behind this approach was to divert, through programs such as integrated conservation and development projects, community-based natural resource management or other environment-friendly commercial ventures, the allocation of labour and capital from ecosystem damaging activities toward ecosystem conserving activities (Wells et al., 1992; Ferraro and Simpson, 2002) . However, despite the initial enthusiasm, e¤ec-tiveness and cost-e¢ ciency concerns have led to abandonment of this approach in favour of compensations to be paid directly to the landholders providing conservation services (see e.g. Ferraro, 2001; Ferraro and Kiss, 2002; Ferraro and Simpson, 2005) . A direct approach, mainly represented by schemes like Payments for environmental services (hereafter, PES) has become increasingly common in both developed and developing countries. Under a PES program, a provider delivers to a buyer a well-de…ned ES (or corresponding land use) in exchange for an agreed payment. 1 Unfortunately, also the e¢ cacy of PES programs has been questioned since their performance has not always met the established conservation targets. 2 In particular, lack of additionality in the conservation e¤orts induced by the programs has often been suspected. 3 In other words, it seems that in practice landholders have been practically paid for conserving the same extent of land they would have conserved without the program. Considering the limited amount of money for conservation initiatives and the perverse e¤ect that wasting it may have on future funding, further research is needed to increase our understanding of the economic agent's conversion decision.
The literature investigating optimal conservation decisions under irreversibility and uncertainty over the net bene…ts attached to conservation represents a signi…cant branch of environmental and resource economics (Bulte et al., 2002, Kassar and Lassere, 2004 ; Leroux et al., 2009) . A unifying aspect in this literature is the stress on the e¤ect that irreversibility and uncertainty have on decision making. In fact, since irreversible conversion under uncertainty over future prospects may be later regretted, this decision may be postponed to bene…t from option value attached to the maintained ‡exibility (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) . Pioneer papers such as Arrow and Fisher (1974) and Henry (1974) have been followed by several other contributions which have improved the modelling e¤ort and solved the technical problems posed by increasingly complex model set-up. 4 Two contributions close to ours are Bulte et al. (2002) and Leroux et al. (2009) . In the …rst paper, the authors determine the optimal forest stock to be held by trading o¤ pro…t from agriculture and the value of ES attached to forest conservation. Their analysis highlights the value of the option to postpone land clearing under irreversibility of environmental impact and uncertainty about conservation bene…ts. A similar problem is solved in Leroux et al. (2009) where, unlike the previous paper, the authors allow for ecological feedback and consider its impact both on the expected trend and volatility of ES value.
Both papers, however, by solving the allocative problem from a central planner perspective, miss the complexity of challenges characterizing conservation policies and the role that competition on markets for agricultural products may have on conversion decisions.
In this paper, we aim to investigate these issues by modelling conversion decisions in a decentralized economy populated by a multitude of homogenous landholders and where the Government has introduced a payment scheme for conservation. Each landholder manages a portion of total available land and may conserve or develop it by a¤ording some conversion cost. If land is conserved, ES have a value proportional to the area conserved which randomly ‡uctuates following a geometric Brownian motion. If the parcel is developed, land enters as an input into the production of goods or services (co¤ee, rubber, soy, palm oil, timber, biofuels, cattle, etc.) and the farmer must compete with other farmers on the market. In this context, the Government introduces a land use policy which aims to balance conservation and development.
The policy is based on a PES scheme implemented through a conservation contract establishing di¤erent requirements and payments before and after land conversion has occurred. In particular, if the entire plot is conserved, then the landholder receives a certain payment whereas if he/she decides to clear it, then he/she must set aside the portion indicated in the contract (i.e. the plot may be only partially developed) and receives a di¤erent payment. Finally, we also consider the possibility that the Government may impose a 1 In this respect we follow Wunder (2005, p. 3) where a PES is de…ned as "(i) a voluntary transaction where (ii) a well-de…ned ES (or a land-use likely to secure that service) (iii) is being "bought" by a (minimum one) ES buyer (iv) from a (minimum one) ES provider (v) if and only if the ES provider secures ES provision (conditionality)". 2 As reported by Ferraro (2001) , this may be due to several reasons such as lack of funding, failures in institutional design, poor de…nition and weak enforcement of property rights and strategic behaviour by potential ES providers. See Ferraro (2008) on information failures and Smith and Shogren (2002) on speci…c contract design issues. 3 We refer in particular to government-…nanced programs. On the performance of user vs. government-…nanced interventions see Pagiola (2008) on PSA program in Costa Rica and Wunder et al. (2008) for a comparative analysis of PES programs in developed and developing countries. See Ferraro and Pattanayak (2006) for a call on empirical monitoring of conservation programs. 4 Among them, see for instance Conrad (1980) , Clarke and Reed (1989) , Reed (1993) , Conrad (1997) , Conrad (2000) .
limit on the total forested land which can be cleared. Under this conservation program we solve for the conversion path taking a real option approach but unlike from previous literature we internalize the role of market entry dynamics. It follows that under competition the conversion path must be determined on the basis of a long-run zero pro…t condition. In this respect, it becomes interesting to study the impact that di¤erent payment scheme may have on the conversion dynamic. We then allow for two di¤erent PES schemes. Under the …rst one, the payment rate for land unit is more generous when the entire plot is conserved while in the second scheme the opposite is proposed. Both situations may arise in reality, re ‡ecting di¤erent sensitivity towards conservation or, more practically, the way Governments try to adapt to the economic and political framework they face. 5 Under both schemes, we are able to determine analytically the optimal conversion rules. Not surprisingly, conversion is postponed if landholders conserving the entire plot receive a higher payment. This is due to the higher cost opportunity of conversion which is higher since it includes the payments implicitly given up converting. Interestingly, we show that, as suggested by Ferraro (2001) , a landholder may conserve the entire plot even if partially compensated for the provided ES. Moreover, under this payment design, only progressive reductions in the payments trigger land clearing and, at the end, landholders may clear a surface smaller than the one targeted by the Government. With the second payment design, i.e. higher transfer if land is developed, the structure of incentives is reversed and an implicit bias toward conversion is introduced. An important mass of landholders rapidly convert land till the last plot where pro…t from agriculture covers the conversion cost while the rest prefers to wait and clear the plots only if payments rise. Under both PES designs, we note that, by setting a limit to the land surface that landholders may develop together, the Government may induce rush in the conversion dynamics. 6 In fact, landholders, fearing a restriction in the exercise of the option to convert, may start a conversion run which rapidly exhausts the entire forest stock up to the …xed limit. 7 Finally, to assess the temporal performance of the optimal conservation policy and study the impact of increasing uncertainty about future environmental bene…ts on conversion speed, we rearrange the optimal conversion rules in the form of regulated processes (Harrison, 1985, chp. 2) and derive the long-run average growth rate of deforestation. Hence, under di¤erent policy scenarios, we use the rate of deforestation to rank di¤erent policies on the basis of current optimal forest stock and expected total conversion time. Interestingly, we show that uncertainty about payments, even if it induces conversion postponement in the short-run, reduces expected time for total conversion in the long run.
We then use it to illustrate, through several numerical simulations, optimal forest conversion in Costa Rica. 8 We …nd that when landholders conserving the whole plot are o¤ered a higher payment with respect to the ones developing, then higher uncertainty over payments increases the long-run average rate of conversion. The opposite occurs when the policy rewards more generously farmers conserving only a portion of their plot.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the basic set-up for the model is presented. In Section 3 we study the equilibrium in the conversion strategies under two policy scenarios. In Section 4, we discuss issues related to the PES voluntary participation and contract enforceability. Section 5 is devoted to the derivation of the long-run average rate of conversion. In Section 6 we illustrate our main …ndings through numerical exercises. Section 7 concludes. 5 For instance, if forest conservation does not qualify under the CDM (Clean Development Mechanism) while reforestation does, then it may be plausible for a Government to push towards timber harvest and subsequent reforestation on some land in order to cash funding on carbon markets and …nance conservation on the remaining habitat. Note that this was actually the case in the …rst commitment period (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (IPCC, 2007) . 6 In Australia, the Productivity Commission reports evidence of pre-emptive clearing due to the introduction of clearing restrictions (Productivity Commission, 2004 ). On unintended impacts of public policy see for instance Stavins and Ja¤e (1990) showing that, despite an explicit federal conservation policy, 30% of forested wetland conversion in the Mississippi Valley has been induced by federal ‡ood-control projects. In this respect, see also Maestad (2001) showing how timber trade restrictions may induce an increase in logging. 7 A similar e¤ect has been …rstly noted by Bartolini (1993) . In this paper, the author studies decentralized investment decision in a market where a limit on aggregate investment is present. 8 Unlike Leroux et al. (2009) who exogenously assume a maximum annual conversion rate (2.5% in the case of Costa Rica forests), we calculate it optimally on the basis of land currently converted and information on current and future payments.
A Dynamic Model of Land Conversion
Consider a country where at time period t = 0 the total land available, L, is allocated as follows:
where A 0 is the surface cultivated and F is the portion still in its pristine natural state covered by primary forest. 9 Assume that F is divided into small and homogenous parcels of equal extent held by a multitude of identical risk-neutral agents. 10 By normalizing such extent to 1 hectare, F denotes also the number of agents in the economy. 11 Natural habitats provide valuable environmental goods and services at each time period t.
12 Let B(t) represent the per-parcel value of such goods and services and assume it randomly ‡uctuates according to the following geometric Brownian motion:
where and are respectively the drift and the volatility parameters, and dz(t) is the increment of a Wiener process.
13
At each t, two competitive and mutually exclusive destinations may be given to forested land: conservation or irreversible development. Once the plot is cleared, the landholder becomes a farmer using land as an input for agricultural production (or commercial forestry). 14 
The Government
To induce conservation the Government o¤ers to each agent a contract to be accepted on a voluntary basis. A compensation equal to 1 B(t) with 1 2 [0; 1] is paid at each time period t if the entire plot is conserved. 15 On the contrary, if the landholder aims to develop his/her parcel, a restriction is imposed in that a portion of the total surface, 0 1, must be conserved. 16 In this case, a payment equal to 2 B(t) with 2 2 [0; 1] may be o¤ered to compensate the landholder. 17 Since ES usually have the nature of public good, payment rates, 1 and 2 , may be interpreted as the levels of appropriability that the society is willing to 9 As in Bulte et al. (2002) A 0 may represent the best land which has been converted to agriculture. 1 0 At the moment for the sake of generality we refer to landholders. Later we will discuss the implications of our model with respect to property rights issues. 1 1 None of our results relies on this assumption. In fact, provided that no single agent has signi…cant market power, we can obtain identical results by allowing each agent to own more than one unit of land. See e.g. Baldursson (1998) and Grenadier (2002) . 1 2 They may include biodiversity conservation, carbon sequestration, watershed control, provision of scenic beauty for recreational activities and ecotourism, timber and non-timber forest products. See e.g. Conrad (1997) , Conrad (2000) , Clarke and Reed (1989) , Reed (1993) , Bulte et al. (2002) . 1 3 The Brownian motion in (2) is a reasonable approximation for conservation bene…ts and we share this assumption with most of the existing literature. Conrad (1997, p. 98 ) considers a geometric Brownian motion for the amenity value as a plausible assumption to capture uncertainty over individual preferences for amenity. Bulte et al. (2002, p.152 ) point out that "parameter can be positive (e.g., re ‡ecting an increasingly important carbon sink function as atmospheric CO2 concentration rises), but it may also be negative (say, due to improvements in combinatorial chemistry that lead to a reduced need for primary genetic material)". However, this assumption neglects the direct feedback e¤ect that conversion decisions may have on the stochastic process illustrating the dynamic of conservation bene…ts. See Leroux et al. (2009) for a model where such e¤ect is accounted by letting conservation bene…ts follow a controlled di¤usion process with both drift and volatility depending on the conversion path. 1 4 In the following, "landholder" refers to an agent conserving land and "farmer" to an agent cultivating it. 1 5 As pointed out by Engel et al. (2008) , by internalizing external non-market values from conservation, PES schemes have attracted increasing interest as mechanisms to induce the provision of ES. 1 6 Note that our analysis is general enough to include also the case where is not imposed but is endogenously set by each landholder. In fact, due for instance to …nancial constraints limiting the extent of the development project, the landholders may …nd optimal not to convert the entire plot. 1 7 Note that our contract scheme is in line with Ferraro (2001, p. 997) where the author states that conservation practitioners "may also …nd that they do not need to make payments for an entire targeted ecosystem to achieve their objectives. They need to include only "just enough" of the ecosystem to make it unlikely, given current economic conditions, infrastructure, and enforcement levels, that anyone would convert the remaining area to other uses". In addition, taking a di¤erent perspective, our framework seems supported also by wildlife protection programs which rarely pay farmers more than a fraction of the losses due to wildlife (See Rondeau and Bulte, 2007) . guarantee on the value generated by conserving, i.e. B(t) and B(t) respectively. 18 In addition, besides the Government …xes an upper level A on total land conversion. This limit may preclude land development for some landholders. The number of landholders for whom conserving the entire plot may become compulsory depends on the magnitude of . In fact, note that may be low enough to allow every landholder to clear land. However, the de…nition of does not need to meet such requirement since other issues may be prioritized, i.e. habitat fragmentation, critical ecological thresholds, enforcement and transaction costs for the program implementation, etc. Thus, denoting by N = A 1 the number of potential farmers involved in the conversion process, we assume N F . Our framework is general enough to include di¤erent conservation targets such as old-growth forests or habitat surrounding wetlands, marshes, lagoons or by the marine coastline and meet several spatial requirements. For instance, the conservation target may be represented by an area divided into homogenous parcels running along a river or around a lake or a lagoon where, to maintain a signi…cant provision of ecosystem services, a portion of each parcel must be conserved (see …gure 1). As stressed by the literature in spatial ecology, the creation of bu¤er areas, by managing the proximity of human economic activities, is crucial since it guarantees the e¢ ciency of conservation measures in the targeted areas. 19 In this case the conservation program may be induced by implementing a payment contract schedule di¤erentiating for the state of land i.e. totally conserved vs. developed within the restriction enforced through environmental law. However, we are also able to consider the opposite case where the landholder may totally develop his/her plot but an upper limit is …xed on the total extent of land which can be cleared in the region. 20 
The Landholders
Developing the parcel is an irreversible action which has a sunk cost, (1 )c, including cost for clearing and settling land for agriculture. 21 Denoting by A(t) the total land developed at time t, the number of farmers must be equal to N (t) =
and since 1 is …xed, the conversion dynamic must mirror the variation in the number of farmers, i.e. dN (t) = dA(t) 1
. Therefore, assuming that the extent of each plot is small enough to exclude any potential price-making consideration, we may use either N (t) or A(t) when evaluating the individual decision process. 22 Competition on the market for agricultural products implies that at each time period t the optimal number of farmers (or the optimal total land developed) is determined by the entry zero pro…t condition. In addition, since the per-parcel value of services, B(t), makes all agents symmetric, some random mechanism must be used to select which landholder develops …rst.
We assume a constant elasticity demand function for agricultural products. Since supply depends on the surface cultivated, then let demand be speci…ed as P A (t) = A(t) with A(0) = A 0 (> 1), where is a parameter illustrating di¤erent positions of the demand and is the inverse of the demand elasticity. Now, let's solve for the conversion process taking 1 , 2 and as exogenously given parameters. Denoting by P A (t) the marginal return as land is cleared over time, the farmer instantaneous pro…t function is given by:
The discounted present value of the net bene…ts over an in…nite horizon is:
where r is the constant risk-free interest rate, 24 (A(t); B(t); A)=(1 )P A (t) + ( 2 1 )B(t) and t is the stochastic conversion time. 25 In (4) the …rst term represents the perpetuity paid by the Government if the parcel is conserved forever, while the second term represents the extra pro…t that each landholder may expect if she/he clears the land and becomes a farmer. The extra pro…t is, given by the crop yield sold on the market plus the di¤erence in the payments received by the Government. As soon as the excess pro…t from land development equals the deforestation cost the landholder may clear the parcel. This implies that the optimal conversion timing depends only on the second term in (4).
assume, without loss of generality, that the conversion cost is proportional to the surface cleared. 2 2 To consider in…nitesimally small agents is a standard assumption in in…nite horizon models investigating dynamic industry equilibrium under competition. See for instance Jovanovic (1982) , Dixit (1989) , Hopenhayn (1992) , Lambson (1992) , Dixit and Pindyck (1994, chp. 8) , Bartolini (1993) , Caballero and Pindyck (1996) , Dosi and Moretto (1992) and Moretto (2008) . 2 3 See Harrison (1985, p. 44) . 2 4 The introduction of risk aversion does not change the results since the analysis can be developed under a risk-neutral probability measure for B(t). See Cox and Ross (1976) for further details. 2 5 Note that the expected value is taken accounting for A(t) increasing over time as land is cleared.
The Competitive Equilibrium
Denote by V (A(t); B(t); A) the value function of an in…nitely living farmer. 26 By (4), the optimal conversion time, , solves the following maximization problem:
where I [t= ] is an indicator function and the expectation is taken considering that the total land developed A may vary over time. The indicator function states that, due to competition among farmers on the market, at the time of conversion the value from converting land must equal the cost of land clearing. In the real option literature the problem we must solve is referred to as "optimal stopping" (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994 ). The idea is that at any point in time the value of immediate investment (stopping) is compared with the expected value of waiting dt (continuation), given the information available at that point in time (the value of the stochastic variable B and the stock of land developed, A) and the knowledge of the two processes. If the initial size of the active farmers is A A 0 , we expect the converting process to work as follows: for a …xed number of farmers, pro…ts in (3) move stochastically driven by B. As soon as the per-parcel value of ES reaches a critical level, say B C , development (i.e. entry into the agricultural market) becomes feasible. This implies an increase, dA, in cultivated land and a drop in revenues from agriculture along the function P A (A). The value of services will then continue to move stochastically until the next entry occurs.
In this setting the (competitive) equilibrium bounding the pro…t process for each farmer can be constructed as a symmetric Nash equilibrium in entry strategies. By the in…nite divisibility of F , the equilibrium can be determined by simply looking at the single landholder clearing policy which is de…ned ignoring the competitors'entry decisions (see Leahy 1993) . Consider a short interval dt where any conversion takes place. Over this interval A is constant and the farmer holds an asset paying 
This is an ordinary di¤erential equation since the number of farmers is constant. Using standard arguments the general solution is (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) :
where 1 < 1 < r= , 2 < 0 are the roots of the characteristic equation Q( ) = 1 2 2 ( 1)+ r = 0 and Z 1 , Z 2 are two constants to be determined.
Case with 1 > 2
Suppose that a lower payment is o¤ered for conservation once land is converted, i.e. 1 > 2 . 28 To determine the optimal conversion threshold, B C (A) = B (A), the landholder must consider bene…ts and costs attached to conversion. According to (7), the pro…t accruing from the crop yield,
A r , is counterbalanced by the di¤erence in the payments, ( 2 1 ) B r , received for conservation. In addition, note that as landholders convert land and become farmers pro…t from agriculture decreases. This negative e¤ect on the value of converted land is accounted for in (7) by the second term (Z 2 (A) 0 for A A). In fact, since 1 > 2 then only an expected reduction in B can induce conversion. This implies that to keep V (A; B; A) …nite we must drop the …rst term by setting Z 1 = 0, i.e. lim B!1 V (A,B; A) = 0. Hence, (7) reduces to:
To determine Z 2 (A) and B (A) some suitable boundary conditions on (8) are required. First, development by increasing the number of competing farmers in the market keeps the value of being an active farmer below (1 )c. Second, marginal rents for an active farmer must be null B (A). These considerations can be formalized by the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Provided that each agent rationally forecasts the future dynamics of the market for agricultural goods for land to be converted the following condition must hold
where the conversion rule is
Proof. See appendix A.1. For conversion to be optimal, the dynamic zero pro…t condition in (9) must hold at the threshold, B (A). Let's analyse such condition by rearranging (9) as follows:
This means that bene…ts from clearing land and becoming a farmer must match the cost opportunity of conversion, i.e. the cost for clearing and settling land plus the payment perpetuity which is implicitly given up by converting. By Proposition 1 the whole conversion dynamics are characterized in terms of B. Since the agent's size is in…nitesimal, the trigger B (A) must be a decreasing function of A. In both …gure 2 and 3, conservation is optimal in the region above the curve. In fact, in this region, B is high enough to deter conversion and each landholder conserves up to the time where B driven by (2) drops to B (A). Then, as B crosses B (A) from above, a discrete mass of landholders will enter the agricultural market developing (part of ) their land. Since higher competition reduces pro…ts from agriculture, entries take place until conditions for conservation are restored (B > B (A)).
Depending on A, we obtain two di¤erent scenarios (see …gure 2 and 3):
(1) ifÂ A, the conversion process stops atÂ since this is the last parcel for which conversion makes economic sense ( rÂ c = 0). This in turn implies that the surface, A Â 0, is conserved forever at a total cost equal to 1 B r ( A Â ). A, when B hits the threshold B (A), the landholders start a run for conversion up to A. Unlike the previous case, here the limit imposed by the Government binds and restricts conversion on a surface, A Â > 0, where development would be pro…table from the landholder's viewpoint. The intuition behind this result is immediate if we take a backward perspective. When the limit imposed by the Government A is reached, then it must be Z 2 ( A) = 0 since no market entry may occur. Hence, condition (9) reduces to V ( A; B ( A); A)=(1 )
)c from which we obtain (10bis (b)) as optimal trigger. This implies that at A marginal rents induced by future reduction in B are not null, i.e. V B ( A; B; A) < 0, and they would be entirely captured by market incumbents. Since each single landholder realizes the bene…t from marginally anticipating his entry decision, then an entry run occurs to avoid the restriction imposed by the Government. However, by rushing, the rent attached to information on market pro…tability, collectable by waiting, vanishes. Therefore there will be a land extent (i.e. a number of farmers), A + < A, such that for A < A + no landholder …nds it convenient to rush since the marginal advantages from a future reduction in B are lower than the option value lost. 29 Note also that, as As shown in table 1 the de…nition of the last plot,Â, which is worth converting, depends on parameters regulating the demand for agricultural goods, the interest rate and the land unit conversion cost. A higher illustrating a higher demand for agricultural products and/or a more rigid demand movesÂ forward since higher pro…ts support the conversion for a larger land surface. Similarly, as c ! 0, all the available land will be cultivated (Â ! A). With a higher r future returns from agriculture become relatively lower with respect to the cost of clearing land and land conversion is less attractive. In table 2, we provide some comparative statics illustrating the e¤ect that changes in the exogenous parameters have on the threshold level B (A). Changes in an exogenous parameter, whenever increasing (decreasing) conversion bene…ts with respect to conservation bene…ts, rede…ne, by moving upward (downward) the boundary B (A), the conversion and conservation regions. In this light, for instance, to a higher corresponds higher pro…ts from agriculture and thus a higher B (A) and a larger conversion region. The same e¤ect is also produced by a relatively more inelastic demand. On the contrary, the opposite occurs as c increases since a higher conversion cost decreases net conversion bene…ts.With an increase in the interest rate, exercise of the option to convert should be anticipated but this e¤ect is too weak to prevail over the e¤ect that a higher r has on the cost opportunity of conversion. Studying the e¤ect of volatility, , and of growth parameter, , the sign of the derivatives is in line with the standard insight in the real options literature. An increase in the growth rate and volatility of B determines postponed exercise of the option to convert. This can be explained by the need to reduce the regret of taking an irreversible decision under uncertainty. Since the cost of this decision is growing at a faster rate and there is uncertainty about its magnitude, waiting to collect information about future prospects is a sensible strategy.
As expected, an increase in 1 pushes the barrier downward since it makes it more pro…table to conserve the plot and keep open the option to convert. In line with this result, the barrier responds in the opposite way to an increase in 2 which implicitly provides an incentive to conversion. Changes in have a nonmonotonic e¤ect on the barrier which depends on the ratio between the two payment rates. A higher de…nes a stricter requirement on development that may push the barrier downward for two reasons. First, a lower return from agriculture since less land is cultivated which is, however, balanced by a lower cost for clearing land, and second, as 1 and the barrier shifts upward can be easily explained by inverting the second argument.
These considerations mostly hold for both (10) and (10 bis). Clearly, over the interval A + < A A since the option multiple, 2 2 1 , drops out, the barrier B (A) is not a¤ected by . The derivative with respect to the bene…t drift maintains the sign in table 2 while the comparative statics on r reveals:
Finally, since by (10bis) the same level of B triggers the entry of a positive mass of landholders, i.e. B (A + ) = B ( A), it is worth highlighting that the surface triggering a conversion rush is independent of the de…nition of 1 , 2 and . The Government policy may either speed up or slow down the conversion dynamic but it cannot alter A + which depends only on the choice of A with respect toÂ. Note that
> 0 which reasonably means that as A !Â the run would be triggered only by a relatively a lower level for B. In other words, since in expected terms a higher A implies a less strict threat of being regulated, then landholders are not willing to give up information rents collectable by waiting. Not surprisingly, @A + @Â < 0. A lowerÂ implies a faster drop in the pro…t from agriculture as A increases and then a lower incentive for the conversion run.
Case with 1 < 2
Now, assume that 1 < 2 . In this case 2 > 1 will necessarily obtain, that is, the payment rate per unit of land conserved is more generous when a portion of the plot has been developed. This could be the case for a Government which, having run out of funding for the conservation program, may be willing to sacri…ce some pristine habitat in order to more generously …nance conservation on a smaller scale. 32 Di¤erently, this choice may also be reasonably explained by a Government wishing to indirectly induce a switch towards certain agricultural or forestry practises by o¤ering a more favourable payment rate. For instance, the Government may choose to prefer timber harvest and subsequent reforestation as land-use to cash funding on carbon markets and …nance conservation on the remaining habitat. 33 In this case, our model allows framing of the competition between these two "green" but mutually exclusive land destinations, i.e. secondary forests vs. primary forests. Finally, the Government could simply consider it fair and/or politically expedient to better reward conservation as soon as the restriction on development is binding and the real conservation cost opportunity is implicitly revealed. As in the previous section, the optimal conversion threshold, B C (A) = B (A), must be determined by matching bene…ts and costs from conversion. Unlike the previous case, when developing land in addition to the pro…t accruing from agriculture, (1 )
A r , the landholder can earn a higher payment for ES provision since ( 2 1 ) B r > 0. Hence, it makes sense to clear land as B increases. However, as above market competition has a negative e¤ect on the value from farming which, being entry-free, lies below (1 )c. This e¤ect is accounted for the …rst term (Z 1 (A) 0 for A A) in (7) since as lim B!0 V (A; B; A) = 0 then to keep V (A; B; A) …nite we must set Z 2 = 0. It follows that (7) reduces to:
As in the previous case, we determine Z 1 (A) and B (A) by imposing the free entry condition and zero marginal rents at B (A). That is, Proposition 2 Provided that each agent rationally forecasts the future dynamics of the market for agricultural goods for land to be converted the following condition must hold
(ii) ifÂ > A then B (A) = 0; for A 0 < A A (13 bis) where = ;Â = ( rc ) 1= and A ++ = [
Proof. See appendix A.3. Equation (12) de…nes the dynamic zero pro…t condition which must hold at B (A). Proposition 2 illustrates the conversion dynamic as B ‡uctuates according to (2) . Here, unlike the previous case, the threshold B (A) is an increasing continuous function of A and the conversion region is above the barrier. Development is worthwhile only if B crosses B (A) from below. In the conservation region the landholder conserves as B is not high enough to trigger conversion and waits until the stochastic process B moves up to B (A). At that point, a mass of landholders enters the market keeping pro…ts low enough to push the barrier upward. Also in this case, depending on the value of A, two di¤erent scenarios emerge (see …gure 4 and 5). That is, (1) ifÂ A then a surface equal toÂ is converted independently from the value taken by B. In the interval A 0 < A Â landholders rush as agricultural pro…ts are so high that there is no reason to wait. Moreover, they know that no matter what value B takes, they are paid more for conserving less since 2 > 1 ; once the surfaceÂ has been converted, landholders convert smoothly up to A ++ according to (13b). Note that over the intervalÂ < A A ++ , as land is converted, an increasing B is required to trigger conversion. This is due to the fact that pro…t from agriculture does not cover the cost of clearing and settling land for cultivation. Hence, landholders convert only if the payment for conservation is high enough to cover the gap.
if B is high enough to support conversion up to A ++ then a run is activated and the remaining land is cleared up to the upper limit. This dynamic is due to the fact that an upper limit, A, has been established for development. In fact, since for A > A the value attached to conversion vanishes, to cash it each landholder must run to anticipate the others. However, as in the previous case, the run dissipates the rent that the landholders earn by postponing conversion and collecting information on market pro…tability, i.e. at B (A An increase in has a monotonic downward shifting e¤ect on the barrier. 34 This makes sense since for any level of B the payment rate on the additional marginal land unit to be set aside is higher if land is developed ( 2 > 1 ). We complete the analysis of (13) by studying the barrier B (A) for A ++ < A A. Since the option value multiple, 1 1 1 , drops out, the barrier is not a¤ected by . We also note that unlike the results in table 3, @B (A) @ 0 and:
Finally, also in this case, the policy parameters 1 , 2 and are neutral in the de…nition of A ++ in (13 bis).
This threshold depends only onÂ and the ceiling A. We …nd that
If the limit A is less strict, the landholders are less willing to dissipate information rents and participate in the run only for high level of B. A lowerÂ implies a faster fall in the pro…t from agriculture as A increases and then a higher incentive for developing land as soon as B is high enough. Since this consideration is anticipated by all landholders, the run starts at a lower A ++ .
Voluntary participation or contract enforceability?
Once the optimal conversion rules have been determined, we focus in this section on the issue of voluntary participation which is a crucial aspect in a PES scheme (Wunder, 2005) . In this section we present the conditions under which the conservation contract is accepted on a voluntary basis. In this respect, two elements must be considered. First, the dynamic of the whole conversion process involving all the landholders who enrolled under the conservation program. Second, the restrictions on land development that the Government may wish to impose in the form of takings on landholders not entering the conservation program. 35 Focusing on the second element, the Government may …nd it desirable for the landholder to only partially develop his plot, i.e. 0 < 1. Conversely, from (9) and (12) it emerges that the landholder may consider it pro…table to develop the entire plot, i.e. = 0. Therefore, the conservation contract may be accepted on a voluntary basis only if each landholder is better-o¤ signing it than not. As can be easily seen, the acceptance will depend on the expectation concerning the ability of the Government to impose a > 0. Let's formalize this consideration assuming that no compensation is paid if a taking occurs. Since by propositions 1 and 2 the conversion is optimal at B C (A) with C = ; , then an in…nitely living landholder signs the contract if and only if:
where 2 [0; 1] is the probability of regulation, i.e. the restriction holds also for landholders not signing the contract. In (14) the LHS describes the position of a landholder within the program while on the RHS we have the expected present value for a landholder not accepting the contract and developing land at time t. Note that in the last case the conversion option is exercised as soon as the expected cost of conversion, (1 )c, equals the expected bene…t from conversion. Rearranging (14) yields:
which holds if
where (r )c is the annualized conversion cost. Depending on the parameters this condition may not hold for some A. Note in fact that since B (A) is a decreasing function of A, while B (A) is increasing, (15) implies that: Proof. Straightforward from propositions 1 and 2.
Segerson and Miceli (1998) show that an agreement can always be signed on a voluntary basis if the probability of future regulation is positive. By Proposition 3 we show that this result does not hold in our frame. In fact, uncertainty about future regulation does not allow capturing of all the agents who can be potentially regulated. A similar result is obtained by Langpap and Wu (2004) in a regulator-landowner twoperiod model for conservation decisions under uncertainty and irreversibility. In their paper, since contract pay-o¤s are uncertain and signing is an irreversible decision, under certain conditions a landholder may not accept it to stay ‡exible. Unlike them, we show that under the same threat of regulation a contract can be voluntarily signed by some landholders and not by others. Not surprisingly, imposing by contract constraints on land development reduces ‡exibility and discourages voluntary participation. Clearly, due to decreasing pro…t from agriculture, this holds for some landholders but not for all since entering the conservation program becomes more attractive as land is progressively cleared. 36 Summing up, we can conclude that voluntary participation crucially depends on the likelihood of takings but also on the magnitude of the compensation payment which a court may impose. In fact, needless to say, if takings can be compensated, then, by (14) and (15), the requirement for contract acceptance becomes more stringent and it is more di¢ cult to sustain agreements on a voluntary basis. 37 5
is not entirely compensated for, we may be able to induce landholders to conserve their plot. However, we believe that this result only "statically" addresses the conservation/development dilemma. Hence, in this section we aim to study the temporal implications of the optimal conversion policy, i.e. how long it takes to clear the target surface A, and the impact of increasing uncertainty about future environmental bene…ts, B, and conversion cost, c, on conversion speed under the two policy scenarios characterized above. To do so, we derive the long-run average growth rate of forest conversion through a robust linear approximation (see Appendix A.4 and A.5). 38 
Case with 1 > 2
Let's consider the case where b A A. This represents the more interesting case since the analysis below remains valid also for the opposite case over the range A < A + . Note in fact that for A A + the long-run rate of reforestation must obviously tend to in…nity due to the conversion run.
Let's now focus our attention on the long-run average growth rate of forest conversion. Rearranging (10) yields:
where^ = 2 2 1 (1 ) c. The …rst term on the RHS of (16) represents the expected discounted pro…t from the cultivation of land conditional on the number of farmers remaining constant. The multiple 2 2 1 < 1 accounts for the presence of uncertainty and irreversibility. The second term is the expected discounted ‡ow of payments implicitly given up by developing land net of the payments for conservation paid for setting aside as required by the Government. Note that can be de…ned as a regulated process in the sense of Harrison (1985, chp. 2) with^ as upper re ‡ecting barrier. This implies that when a reduction of B drives upward toward^ some landholders …nd it pro…table to convert land. New entries in the market, however, determine a drop along P A (A) which by balancing for the e¤ect of B prevents from rising above^ . Since entry is instantaneous, the rate of deforestation is in…nite at^ . 39 Conversely, if <^ the level of B is high enough to support conservation, no entries occur and consequently the deforestation rate is null. Hence, the re ‡ecting barrier 3 6 Note that in this respect the scenario 1 < 2 is the most problematic since switching to competitive farming is so advantageous for the …rst developers that they never accept the contract. This implies that (1) should be restated as L 0 = A 0 0 +F with A 0 0 > A 0 since by (15) only a lower number of landholders may enter the program on a voluntary basis. 3 7 On compensation and land taking see Adler (2008) . 3 8 See Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pp. 372-373), and Hartman and Hendrickson (2002) for a calculation of the long-run average growth rate of investment. 3 9 The fact that at^ the rate of conversion is in…nite follows from the non-di¤erentiability of B and then of A with respect to the time t (see Harrison, 1985; Dixit, 1993 ).
^ does not generate a …nite rate of deforestation over time but long periods of inaction followed by short periods of rapid bursts of land conversion.
In this section, our aim is to then …nd a steady-state (long-run) distribution for A from which we can determine the average growth rate of forest conversion over a long period of time. Since A and B enter additively on (16) some manipulation is required to apply the well-known properties of log-normal distribution and show that is log-normally distributed. 40 Denoting by 1 dt E(d ln A) the measure of the average growth rate of forest conversion, in the appendix we prove that: Proposition 4 When 1 > 2 , for an initial point (B;Ã) such that (B;Ã) =^ (10) can be approximated by
and the average or expected long-run growth rate of deforestation can be approximated by:
where
Proof. See Appendix A.5. Thus, ifB is the current value of ES and, by (10),Ã is the corresponding optimal surface of converted land, the expression in (17b) is the best guess for the average rate at which the forested surface, A Ã , is cleared. Remember that if thenÃ >Â the deforestation rate is null since r A < c for b A < A A. Furthermore, it is straightforward to verify that the rate in (17b) is increasing in the volatility of future payments. Although at a …rst glance this result may seem counterintuitive, it follows from the distribution of the log-normal process with an upper re ‡ecting barrier at^ . A higher volatility has two distinct e¤ects. First, it pushes the barrier^ downward; second, by increasing the positive skewness of the distribution of , it raises the probability of the barrier being reached. 41 Both e¤ects induce a higher rate of deforestation in both the short-run and long-run.
We also note that a higher conversion cost c induces a lower long-run average rate of deforestation. Two e¤ects must be recognized. The …rst is immediate and driven by the higher c. The second is more subtle. A higher c prevents from converting now for a certain B. Since conversion in the future will be triggered by a decreasing B the landholder can bene…t from an implicit advantage by paying a lower ( 1 2 )B which is a conversion cost opportunity.
Case with 1 < 2

Consider the interval b
A A. 42 Rearranging (13) yields: (18) is the expected discounted pro…t from the cultivation of land if any further conversion occurs. The multiple 1 1 1 > 1 accounts for uncertainty and irreversibility. Unlike (16), since 1 < 2 the second term stands for the expected discounted ‡ow of payments received when developing ; net of the payments implicitly given up. Again, & can be characterized as a regulated process having& as upper re ‡ecting barrier. Whenever an increase in B leads & upward toward& new plots are cleared. This will produce an increase in the supply of agricultural goods and consequently a drop along P A (A) preventing & from passing&. It follows that to keep the surface conserved unchanged, we must have & >&.
4 0 Technically, the log-normality is a property of the process for linearized around an initial point (B;Ã). See Appendix A.5 for further details. 4 1 We show in appendix A.6 that to a higher corresponds a higher probability of hitting^ and thus a higher long run average deforestation rate. 4 2 The same discussion provided in the previous section applies for A A ++ .
As shown in the appendix:
Proposition 5 When 1 > 2 , for an initial point (B;Ã) such that &(B;Ã) =& (13) can be approximated by:
Proof. See Appendix A.5. As above, (19b) is the best guess for the average rate at which the forest stock, A Ã , is exhausted over a long-run horizon. Furthermore, the long-run average rate of deforestation (19b) is decreasing in the volatility of future payments. Again, it should be remembered that & is a log-normal process with an upper re ‡ecting barrier at&. As volatility soars the barrier& moves upward and positive skewness in the distribution of & increases. Whilst the …rst has a reducing e¤ect on the rate, the second raises the probability of hitting& and consequently the rate of deforestation. 43 In addition, since the expected discounted pro…t from competitive farming decreases as land is converted, the former e¤ect prevails in the long-run. Conversely, we …nd that the rate is increasing in c. This may seem surprising at …rst sight. As a higher c prevents conversion we would expect landholders to hold on the decision to develop, but postponing conversion is costly since the per-period increase in payments ( 2 1 ) B > 0 would have to be given up. Since the weight of expected discounted higher payments accruing if conversion is anticipated prevails over the expected pay-o¤ from delay, the average rate of deforestation is increasing in c. More formally, a higher c, by inducing a shift upward for the barrier, should de…nitely decrease the probability of hitting it. However, as c increases, then A decreases and so does A ++ . This means that a run will start at a lower surface A ++ as soon as B ( A) has been reached. Since the run will exhaust the stock A and drastically lower the pro…t from agriculture then A ++ Â landholders will prefer to anticipate the conversion. Note that since
@Â
> 0 , even for a B < B ( A), they will prefer to convert to trade-o¤ the dramatic e¤ect on the pro…t due to the run with a higher pro…t from farming. This latter e¤ect justi…es a higher deforestation rate in the long-run.
The Costa Rica case study
In this section we provide a numerical example to illustrate our …ndings. We calibrate the model to …t the characteristics of a humid Atlantic zone of Costa Rica. 44 Parameters in our calculations take the following values:
1. The total extent of originally forested area is A = 320000 hectares. On this extent, we consider a converted portion equal to A 0 = 25000 hectares. 45 We draw demand for agricultural products as in Bulte et al. (2002) by setting = $6990062 (in 1998 US$) and = 0:887.
2. The annual value of ES is equal toB = $75=ha. This value accounts only for the forest production function and does not include the regulatory function and existence values. As B is assumed to ‡uctuate according to (2) we investigate the impact of its drift, , and volatility, , on the optimal forest stock.
To do this, in our analysis takes values 0, 0:025, and 0:05 while varies within the interval [0; 0:325].
3. A 7% risk free interest rate is assumed (r = 0:07). Finally, unlike Bulte et al. (2002) where c = 0 we also consider di¤erent levels of costly deforestation. For the case 1 > 2 we study the following …ve di¤erent policy scenarios: Table 4 : policy scenarios and compare them for two di¤erent levels of costly deforestation, c = 0 and c = 500, respectively. 46 In particular, by these comparisons, our aim is -1 vs. 2: to highlight the impact of a reduction in the compensation for ES provision on the landholders' decision to conserve. Note that scenario 1 resembles the case of a centralized economy in Bulte et al. (2002) where the planner optimally allocates land by comparing expected marginal bene…t from conservation and its expected marginal cost opportunity.
-1 vs. 3: to study the e¤ect of restricted land development on the optimal forest stock and on the long-run average rate of deforestation.
-4 vs. 5: to verify the e¤ect of a more favourable conservation payment rate when the restriction on land development is binding (i.e. land development is privately optimal).
In the tables below we provide the optimal forest stock which should be held, A Ã , 47 and the average deforestation rate (Def rate) at which such stock should be optimally exhausted in the long-run. 48 Note that in our calculations the deforestation rate may be null in two cases. First, when the optimal forest stock, A Ã is completely exhausted and second, when conditions in (17b) or (19b) do not hold. We will distinguish between them using 0 for the former and a dash for the latter. Tables 5, 6 , 7 and 8 we show that: i) the optimal forest stock increases as soars. With higher uncertainty, conversion is triggered at a lower level for B. This implies that for any given value ofB the corresponding optimal converted surface must be lower. Note that as anticipated by (17) the long-run rate of deforestation is increasing in ;
Scenarios 1 and 2 By
ii) the optimal forest stock increases in . This makes sense as long as a higher expected growth rate on the level of PES induces conversion postponement. The long-run average rate of deforestation decreases in the drift. This is not a surprising result since an increase in , by leading downward and far from , must reduce the average rate;
iii) for c = 0 Government policies have no e¤ect on the long-run deforestation rate. On the contrary, we observe a reducing e¤ect when c = 500. However, note that if conversion is costly (c > 0) and A <Â, the reduction in the long-run deforestation rate is also due to the presence of a threshold A + where the deforestation rate is in…nite. 49 Note also that as may be expected, a higher land stock is conserved with costly conversion. Finally, we observe that a reduction in 1 has a strong e¤ect on the optimal forest stock but only a marginal e¤ect on the deforestation rate. α=0.00 α=0.025 α=0.05 Table 6 : Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation in scenario 2 with c = 0
For instance, consider the case where = 0 and = 0:225. Under scenario 1, the optimal forest stocks held are respectively 114723ha with c = 0 and 215077ha with c = 500 while the deforestation rates are 2:85% and 2:45% respectively. Under scenario 2 with a 30% lower conservation payment rate, the forest stock increases from 13115ha with c = 0 to 173266ha with c = 500. The rate is unchanged with c = 0 while it reduces to 2:31% for c = 500. From tables 5 and 7 we note that a slightly higher expected payment growth rate, = 0:025, induces an increase in the forested land stock from 177125ha to 202243ha while the deforestation rate becomes practically null (from 0:04% to 0:03%). In this case by reducing 1 to 0:7, the forest stock is 106405ha with c = 0 and 156461ha with c = 500. Conversely, there is no e¤ect on the deforestation rate since we have respectively 0:04% and 0:03%.
Comparing results for = 0:05 in all the tables, the long-run average rate of deforestation is practically null. In particular, comparing table 6 and 7 we note that, even if at the cost of some hectares of forest, a second-best policy establishing a reduced payment, 1 = 0:7, guarantees the same results in terms of deforestation rates and a forest stock however higher than the one currently available in the Atlantic region. Table 8 : Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation in scenario 2 with c = 500
Scenarios 1 and 3 Let's focus on the role of restrictions on land development by comparing scenario 1 (tables 5, 7) and 3 (tables 9, 10) where respectively no set-aside ( = 0) and 30% ( = 0:3) set-aside requirements are established by the conservation contract signed by the landholder. Note that such requirement is not compensated ( 2 = 0) and thus it is similar to a taking. In this case, however, unlike a taking which is generally imposed by law, the requirement is accepted on a voluntary basis by signing the initial conservation contract.
α=0.00 α=0.025 α=0.05 Table 9 : Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation in scenario 3 with c = 0 Table 10 : Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation in scenario 3 with c = 500
The e¤ect of the restriction is quite evident. In fact, by reducing the pro…t from agriculture it implicitly induces forest conservation. However, for the case discussed in the previous section ( = 0, = 0:225) the introduction of such constraint has no signi…cant e¤ect on the forest stock and on the rate of deforestation. With c = 0, the forest stock increases from 114723ha to 182690ha while the deforestation rate remains the same (2:85%). For c = 500, the forested surface increases from 215077ha to 246279ha with a limited change in the deforestation rate (from 2:45% to 2:56%). For the same level of volatility, as expected, a higher payment growth rate ( = 0:025) induces landholders to hold on conservation since the cost opportunity of conversion is higher.
Scenarios 4 and 5
We elicit the e¤ect of a payment for conserved land ( 2 ) when conversion is optimal by comparing scenario 4 (tables 11 and 13) and scenario 5 (tables 12 and 14).
α=0.00 α=0.025 α=0.05 Table 12 : Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation in scenario 5 with c = 0
In both scenarios when the entire plot is conserved the payment, 1 , is equal to 0:7. By contract, as soon as the trigger for land conversion is met, a 30% restriction on land development ( = 0:3) must be respected in exchange for a payment rate 2 = 0:5 in scenario 4 and 2 = 1 in scenario 5. We observe that an increase in the compensation for the restriction implies, ceteris paribus, a reduction in forest stock. For = 0, = 0:225 and c = 0, 50588ha of forest are conserved under scenario 4 while no conservation is undertaken under scenario 5. If conversion is costly (c = 500), the forested surface is equal to 188080ha under scenario 4 and reduces to 144113ha under scenario 5. The reduction in the deforestation rate is minimal (from 2:36% to 2:21%). The analysis above similarly applies when = 0:025. In this section, the analysis is undertaken by …xing 1 = 0:4, 2 = 1, = 0:5 ( = 5) and letting and vary as above. Di¤erently, we suppose that conversion is costly and assume c = 1400 in table 15 and c = 2000 in table 16 . 51 These conversion costs correspond to 11% and 16% respectively of the revenue from agriculture for e A = 25000 and to 58% and 83% for e A = 160000. Other parameters keep the same values as those used in the previous section. In this case, as discussed in section 3.2, the policy introduced by the Government is biased towards conversion. Note in fact that if the payment rate, 2 , is null, then conversion would stop at b A which, with the parameters used in this section, is always lower than A. It follows that the additional deforestation, A b A, is due to the structure of incentives designed by the Government which by paying 2 > 1 is implicitly making attractive an otherwise unpro…table land conversion ( r A < c for b A < A A). In table 15 , we observe that landholders generally prefer land conversion to conservation. Only a limited surface may be conserved if = 0:05. This is mainly due, at least initially (up to b A), to positive pro…t from agriculture over the portion 1 coupled with a more favourable payment rate ( 2 > 1 ) on the portion under conservation. In this interval, deforestation occurs at an in…nite rate. Conversely, as c increases since the speed of deforestation must slow down, we can obtain …nite deforestation rates. Studying the impact of conversion costs we note, by comparing tables 15 and 16, that even if the policy is biased toward conversion, the payment 2 > 1 may not be high enough to cover the gap between agricultural pro…t and conversion costs. This in turn results in very low or null rate of deforestation. Finally, an additional e¤ect is driven by the volatility of payments . Not surprisingly, as uncertainty soars we …nd higher forest stocks and lower rates of deforestation. In this section we propose a di¤erent exercise. In the previous section given a certainB we computed the optimal forest stock and the associated deforestation rate. However, by doing so, we did not address the dynamic long-run e¤ect of the di¤erent conservation policies. In fact, since a history of the previous deforestation dynamic is not available, a comparison between the di¤erent rates of deforestation makes no sense. Here, since we aim to illustrate the temporal implications of a conversion path, i.e. how long it takes to clear the targeted surface A, we establish a common initial converted land surface,Ã = 25000, and let and vary for di¤erent levels of conversion cost, c. Then, by providing the long-run average deforestation rate (Def rate) and the associated expected time for total conversion (Timing), we illustrate the impact of increasing growth and volatility of future payments and conversion cost on conversion speed. ) and no expected growth in the payments ( = 0), the di¤erence in expected total conversion time between the cases c = 500 and c = 0 is substantial (see …gure 6). However, note that this e¤ect vanishes as rises to 2:5%. This means that with low uncertainty it is possible to deter conversion even if costless (c = 0) by simply guaranteeing an expected growth in the payments. This is consistent with the general stronger impact that a higher has in terms of delayed conversion when compared to the e¤ect due to increasing uncertainty. 
Conclusions
In this paper we contribute to the vast literature on optimal land allocation under uncertainty and irreversible habitat conversion. We extend previous work in three respects. First, departing from the standard central planner perspective we investigate the role that competing farming may have on conversion dynamics. Pro…ts from conversion decreasing in the number of developers may discourage conversion in particular if society is willing to reward habitat conservation as land use. Second, in this decentralized framework, we look at the conservation e¤ort that Government land policy, through a combination of voluntary and command approaches, may stimulate. In this regard, an interesting result is represented by the considerable amount of conservation that the Government can induce by partially compensating agents for the ES provided.
In addition, we show that the existence of a ceiling for the stock of developable land may produce perverse e¤ects on conversion dynamics by activating a run which instantaneously exhausts the stock. Third, we believe that time matters when dynamic land allocation is analysed. Hence, we suggest the use of the optimal long-run average expected rate of conversion to assess the temporal performance of conservation policy and we show its utility by running several numerical simulations based on realistic policy scenarios.
A Appendix
The value function of a farmer is given by:
Since each agent rationally forecasts the future dynamics of the market for agricultural goods at B (A) she/he must be indi¤erent between conserving and converting. That is:
In addition, the following conditions must hold (see e.g. proposition 1 in Bartolini (1993) and Grenadier (2002, p. 699)):
and
Finally, considering the limit on conversion, A; imposed by the Government it follows that: 
Since Z 2 A = 0 and 
Finally, by the continuity of B (A) follows that B (A + ) = B ( A). Substituting:
The conversion policy is summarized by (A.1.8) and (A.1.9). The conversion policy should be smooth until the surface A + < A has been converted. At A + landholders rush and a run takes place to convert the residual land before the limit imposed by the Government is met. By (A.1.9), B (A) is decreasing with respect to A. This makes sense since further land conversion reduces the pro…t from agriculture and a landholder would convert land only if she/he expects a future reduction in B.
We must investigate two di¤erent scenarios, i.e.Â A andÂ > A. From (A.1.10) it follows that:
Studying (A.1.10 bis) we can state that since -ifÂ A then it must be A A + . This implies that there is no run taking place. Land will be converted smoothly according to (A.1.8) up toÂ since r A c for A Â ;
-ifÂ > A then it must be A + < A. In this case, land is converted smoothly up to A + where landholders start a run to convert land up to A.
A.2 Value of the option to convert
In this appendix we show that, by competition, the value of the opportunity to develop the plot by the single farmer is null at the conversion threshold. The value of the option to convert, F (A,B; A), is the solution of the following di¤erential equation (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994 , ch. 8):
where B C (A) is the optimal threshold for conversion. Note that this is an ordinary di¤erential equation, the general solution of which can be written as:
where 1 < 1 < r= , 2 < 0 are the positive and the negative root of the characteristic equation ( ) = 1 2 2 ( 1) + r = 0, and C 1 , C 2 are two constants to be determined. Suppose for instance that 1 > 2 . 54 This implies that as B increases, the value of the option to convert should vanish as (lim B!1 F (A; B; A) = 0) then we set C 1 = 0. Now, let's determine the optimal 5 4 It is easy to show that the results in this section would hold also for the case 1 < 2 :
conversion threshold B and the constant C 1 (A). We attach to the di¤erential equation above the following value matching and the smooth pasting conditions:
r It follows that: 
As expected the value of the option to convert is null at B C (A) = B (A).
A.3 Equilibrium under
As in section A.1 the following conditions must hold at B (A)
In addition, since land can be converted only up to A then it follows that: 
However, note that B (A) < 0 for A <Â. Since by (2) B cannot be negative then it must be:
By continuity of B (A) it follows that B (A ++ ) = B ( A). Substituting:
From (A.3.10) it follows that:
As in section (A.1), two di¤erent scenarios may arise. In fact, studying (A.3.10 bis) we observe that since
-ifÂ A then it must beÂ A ++ A. Land will be converted according to (A.3.9 bis) up to A ++ . At A ++ landholders will rush to convert land up to the limit, A, established by the Government (A.3.8);
-ifÂ > A then it must beÂ > A ++ > A. This implies that the conversion process follows (A.3.9 bis) and land is instantaneously developed up to A.
A.4 Long-run distributions
Let h be a linear Brownian motion with parameters and that evolves according to dh = dt + dw. Since by (A.4.3) E(h) is independent on t, di¤erentiating with respect to t, we obtain the expected long-run rate of deforestation:
By the monotonicity property of the logarithm, e B must exists such that ln e B = g ln B. Furthermore, by plugging e B into (10), we can always …nd a surfaceÃ and e J = 2 2 1 (r ) P A (Ã) r such that a linearization along ( g ln B; g ln J) is equivalent to a linearization along (ln e B; ln e J), where g ln J = ln e J. This implies that by setting ( e B;Ã), the long-run average rate of deforestation can be written as: + c andÃ <Â.
Similarly, from the logarithm of (18) we derive:
ln & = ln . This leads to the following expression for the long-run average rate of deforestation: andÃ >Â.
A. 6 The impact of uncertainty on the distribuition of (and &) 
That is, as soars V ar( ) increases and so does the probability of hitting^ which in turn implies an increase in the long run average deforestation rate. 
